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Preventing Innovative Cooperations: 
The Legal Exemptions Unintended Side Effect 
Abstract 
In 2004, European competition law had been faced with considerable changes due to the 
introduction of the new Council Regulation No. 1/2003. One of the major renewals was 
the replacement of the centralized notification system for inter-company cooperations in 
favor of a so-called legal exemption system. We analyze the implications of this reform 
on the agreements firms implement. In contrast to previous research we focus on the 
reform’s impact on especially welfare enhancing, namely innovative agreements. We 
show that the law’s intention to reduce the incentive to establish illegal cartels will be 
reached. However, by the same mechanism, also highly innovative cooperations might 
be prevented. To avoid this unintended effect, we conclude that only fines but not the 
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Preventing Innovative Cooperations: 
The Legal Exemptions Unintended Side Effect 
Zusammenfassung 
Das europäische Wettbewerbsrecht wurde in den vergangenen Jahren grundlegend re-
formiert. Eine der zahlreichen Änderungen bestand in der Einführung der Kartellver-
fahrensverordnung Nr. 1/2003 im Jahr 2004, wodurch das zentralgesteuerte Genehmi-
gungsverfahren für Unternehmenskooperationen (Kartellverbot mit Erlaubnisvorbehalt) 
durch das sogenannte System der Legalausnahme ersetzt wurde. Eine Anmeldung der 
Unternehmenskooperation  ist  danach  nicht  mehr  nötig.  Anstelle  der  Kartellbehörde 
müssen nun die Unternehmen selbst prüfen, ob ihre Vereinbarungen die Freistellungs-
voraussetzungen erfüllen und somit automatisch vom Kartellverbot ausgenommen sind. 
Die Folgen dieser Reform auf die Kooperationsvereinbarungen von Unternehmen wer-
den in dieser Arbeit untersucht. Im Gegensatz zur bisherigen Forschung konzentriert 
sich dieser Artikel jedoch insbesondere auf wohlfahrtssteigernde, innovative Koopera-
tionen. Es wird gezeigt, dass einerseits der Anreiz zu illegalen Vereinbarungen reduziert 
wird. Mittels des gleichen Mechanismus’ werden andererseits jedoch auch besonders 
innovative Vereinbarungen unterbunden. Um diesen Effekt zu verhindern, sollten ledig-
lich die Strafen, nicht aber die Intensität der Wettbewerbsaufsicht erhöht werden. 
 
 
Schlagworte: Wettbewerbspolitik, Durchsetzung des Wettbewerbsrechts, Legalausnah-
me 
 
JEL-Klassifikation: K42, L40  
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Preventing Innovative Cooperations: 
The Legal Exemptions Unintended Side Effect 
1  Introduction 
In 2004, European competition law1 had been faced with considerable changes due to 
the introduction of the new Council Regulation No. 1/2003. The EC’s intention of in-
troducing the new legal instrument was to free resources in order to establish a more ef-
ficient and simpler system of control.2 One of the major renewals was the replacement 
of the centralized notification system for inter-company cooperations in favor of a so-
called legal exemption system. While in the past, firms had to notify their agreements to 
the European Commission (EC), they now have to rely on a self-assessment whether the 
conditions for an exemption from the cartel ban are fulfilled.  
There is a variety of research analyzing the legal consequences of this reform. However, 
the implications from an economic point of view have been rarely discussed. This is a 
crucial issue since the introduction of the legal exemption and the associated threat of 
ex post punishments if the conditions of Article 81(3)3 are not fulfilled puts coopera-
tions at risk. Therefore, not only illegal but also intended legal cooperations might be 
prevented. Now, legal agreements can be interpreted as welfare enhancing. First, the 
cooperating parties are obliged to transfer a fair share of the resulting benefits to the cus-
tomers. Furthermore, the agreements have to contribute to improving the production or 
distribution  of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress. Hence, if the 
reform leads to a reduction in legal agreements by introducing additional regulatory risk, 
total welfare is likely to be reduced, too.  
Previous research on the reform’s economic implications has primarily discussed its po-
tential impact on the type of arrangements firms might implement and further on mod-
eled the firms’ reactions. Barros (2003) analyzes the legal uncertainty created by the re-
moval of the notification system, focusing on the consequences the reform has on the 
                                                 
1  The term “competition law” is mainly used in Europe, whereas “antitrust” derives from American 
English. However, we use the terms “competition law” and “antitrust law” synonymously.  
2  Preamble 10 of the White Paper, OJ EC C 132/1 from 12 May 1999.  
3  According to Article 81(1), agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of underta-
kings, and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as 
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common mar-
ket are prohibited. Article 81(2) declares those agreements null and void. But Article 81(3) contains 
an exception from the categorical cartel ban as agreements among competitors can have de facto also 
positive effects both for participating undertakings and consumers, e.g. R&D agreements. Thus, if the 
conditions stated in paragraph 3 are fulfilled, Article 81(1) can be declared inapplicable.  
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type of cooperation agreements. He finds that, in general, firms will implement less re-
strictive agreements. Neven (2002) instead concentrates on the incentive to engage in 
anti-competitive agreements. He comes to the result that type I errors (beneficial agree-
ments considered an infringement) and type II errors (unlawful practices admitted) are 
induced if the current ex post control system remains unchanged. In order to mitigate 
these errors, he suggests a higher penalty and a more intensive monitoring to increase 
the likelihood of detection.  
Another work close to ours is that of Bergès-Sennou et al. (2006). The authors assume 
that firms are aware of the status of the agreement (in contrast to the assumption in Bar-
ros’ and Neven’s models) and analyze the impact of a given policy on the firm’s de-
cision signing an agreement. They compare the ex ante and ex post control regime by 
considering a model of imperfect audit. Their primary result is that the notification re-
gime is only superior to the legal exemption model if the risk of errors in the evaluation 
is quite high. With increasing accuracy ex post control becomes preferable. However, 
previous research has not taken recent adjustments in European competition law into ac-
count. These changes aim at an increased probability of detection and increased fines 
imposed on companies that infringe EC competition law. By that, the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the competition rules via both ex post detection and ex ante deterrence 
shall be enhanced.  
This paper analyses the effect of the legal exemption on a firm’s cooperation decision. 
In contrast to previous research we focus on the reform’s impact on especially welfare 
enhancing namely innovative agreements. First, we show that the law’s intention to re-
duce the incentive to establish illegal cartels will be reached. However, by the same me-
chanism, also highly innovative cooperations might be prevented. This, indeed, is of 
major political importance. A law preventing innovative cooperations would be a direct 
contrast to the Lisbon strategy and might, in the long run, endanger Europe’s competi-
tiveness. We argue, in contrast to Neven (2002), that only fines but not the monitoring 
activities should be increased in order to deter illegal but not innovative agreements, 
therefore.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section introduces into the 
economic theory on law enforcement and gives an overview of European Antitrust reg-
ulation. Section three presents recent research that has discussed the benefits and defi-
ciencies of the European cartel law modernization from an economic perspective. In the 
fourth section the economic implications of the reform will be analyzed by applying an 
approach based on decision theory. Herein, we show that under the law enforcement 
certain innovative agreements may be ruled out which causes an unintended side effect 
of the legal exemption rule. The last section summarizes the findings and concludes.   
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2  The Economics of Law Enforcement –  
Economic Theory and European Practice 
Optimal  law  enforcement  should  facilitate  beneficial,  welfare  enhancing  agreements 
while all anti-competitive agreements should be deterred. Furthermore, enforcement er-
rors should be avoided. Such errors could occur as on the one hand desirable agreements 
would be falsely considered as an infringement (type I error) with the effect that benefi-
cial agreements would be prohibited. On the other hand, unlawful practices might false-
ly be considered to be beneficial (type II error) with the effect that welfare decreasing 
practices were approved. Finally, enforcement costs should be minimized. Ideally, the 
benefits  of  the  competitive  processes  that  are preserved outweigh the administrative 
costs of detection and sanctioning violations of the competition rules (van den Bergh, 
2006). By introducing such an optimal enforcement system, anti-competitive behavior 
would be fully deterred, producing no errors at zero costs.4  
In order to achieve optimal enforcement the legislator has to decide upon three basic 
dimensions of law enforcement (Shavell, 1993): the timing of legal intervention (ex ante 
versus ex post control), the form of the sanctions, and the role of private parties versus 
public authorities. With respect to the first dimension an ex ante control system has the 
advantage of providing the competition authority with information about market devel-
opments. Furthermore, agreements that do not fulfill the exemption conditions will only 
be approved if certain adjustments are carried out. On the other hand, an ex ante control 
system implicates a higher degree of regulation and higher administrative costs. The op-
timal sanctioning scheme concerning the second dimension depends on the deterrence 
level. Imprisonment should only be employed if monetary sanctions cannot deter from 
illegal behavior appropriately, as imprisonment is socially more expensive. In reference 
to the third dimension, a private enforcement should be favored “where private parties 
quite naturally come into possession of information” (Shavell 1993, p. 267). In contrast, 
when information is difficult and costly to obtain, public enforcement will be necessary. 
In a federal context such as the European Union a fourth dimension occurs: the division 
of competences between a central authority or national enforcement agencies (van den 
Bergh,  2006).  While  a  centralized  approach  allows  for a uniform application of the 
competition law, a decentralized approach has the advantage that the responsible com-
petition authority is closer to the market and thus might obtain the relevant information 
easier and at less cost.  
In reality, the legislator faces various difficulties defining optimal law enforcement in 
antitrust. One of the obstacles are severe information asymmetries. These exist between 
enterprises  that  conclude  anti-competitive  agreements  and  the  competition  authority. 
                                                 
4  The theory on law enforcement builds up on the seminal work of Becker (1968). However, most lite-
rature on the subject has been published in the last 15 years. For an overview see e.g. Garoupa 
(1997), Polinsky, and Shavell (2000).   
IWH  __________________________________________________________________ 
 
IWH-Diskussionspapiere 6/2008  8
Therefore,  the  competition  authority  and  third  parties  have  to  gather  information 
through a costly procedure as they do not possess perfect knowledge about the existence 
and the content of restrictive practices.  
However, firms do not possess information lying outside their scope, like market cha-
racteristics and the application of legal rules (Pirrung, 2004). Hence, firms have to incur 
information costs in order to gather these facts. They are not able to distinguish at zero 
costs and without error whether their agreements are lawful or not.  
With these deficiencies in mind the legislator has to choose enforcement mechanisms 
“that ensure, at reasonable cost, a reasonable degree of compliance with the law” (Posn-
er 2001, p. 266). Hence, such mechanisms should provide adequate incentives for com-
pliance with the law at the lowest possible costs.  
Concerning the four dimensions of law enforcement stated above, by enacting Regula-
tion No. 17, the European Commission chose (1) monetary fines as the form of sanction 
(whereas in the US also imprisonment is used). Furthermore, the EU antitrust policy re-
lies (2) on public enforcement (whereas in the US private enforcement plays a major 
role) and (3) on a notification duty: Restrictive practices that fulfill the conditions of 
Art. 81(3) have to be notified before they come into force (ex ante control). Finally, (4) 
a centralized enforcement system was chosen as only the Commission, being Europe’s 
highest ranked competition authority, had the competence to exempt restrictive practices 
from the cartel ban.   
With the modernization of European competition law the enforcement system changed 
from an ex ante to an ex post control for agreements that fall under 81(3). Additionally, 
both national competition authorities and national courts are now allowed to apply Ar-
ticle 81(3).  Thus, the system changed also from centralized towards decentralized en-
forcement.   
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3  Literature Review 
The economic impact of this comprehensive reform on the quality of enforcement has 
been analyzed by only a few authors, yet. Problems that have been addressed include the 
implications  of  a  decentralized  application  of  European  competition  law  (Geradin, 
2002),  the incentive to engage in anti-competitive agreements after the modernization 
(Neven, 2002), the consequences the reform has on the type of agreements that firms 
implement (Barros, 2003), in how far the system switch affects overall economic effi-
ciency (Pirrung, 2004), and the change of the stage of intervention from an ex ante to an 
ex post control (Bergès-Sennou et al., 2006).  
Geradin (2002) found that in a decentralized system information asymmetries increase 
as the notification system is abolished and competition authorities are not longer able to 
collect information about market developments via the notification. On the other hand 
decentralization reduces asymmetries as national competition authorities are closer to 
the relevant information than a central authority like the Commission.  
Neven (2002) investigates firms’ incentive to engage in anti-competitive agreements 
both before and after the reform. He comes to the result that when firms have the duty to 
notify, most firms use that option and conclude agreements as restrictive as allowed. Af-
ter the removal of the obligatory notification, a fraction of firms would behave con-
servatively and implement agreements that fall short of what would be allowed. Hence, 
beneficial agreements would not be implemented (type I error). Additionally, a range of 
firms would implement unlawful agreements (type II error). In order to mitigate these 
errors, he suggests a higher penalty and an increased likelihood of detection.  
Barros (2003) instead focuses on the legal uncertainty created by the removal of the no-
tification system. Like Neven, he analyzes the consequences the reform has on the type 
of agreements firms implement and models the firms’ reactions. He finds that on the one 
hand, firms will implement more restrictive practices as they do not have to notify any-
more. On the other hand, the decrease in legal certainty will foster firms to follow a 
more conservative practice implementing less restrictive agreements. He concludes that 
the latter effect will dominate the former. 
Pirrung (2004) analyzes whether the reform affects the overall economic efficiency in 
terms of costs and benefits. Without the obligation to notify agreements firms do not re-
veal important information to the Commission anymore. This leads to a transparency 
loss and a larger information asymmetry than under Regulation No. 17. On the other 
hand, affected firms have to face higher risk costs under the new regulation as they can-
not predict how law enforcers might evaluate a certain practice. Finally, the author states 
that the new system induces a higher probability of legal errors due to the decentraliza-
tion. In total, Pirrung is in serious doubt whether Regulation No. 1/2003 will enhance 
the efficiency of law enforcement.  
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Another work discussing the implications of the reform is that of Bergès-Sennou et al. 
(2006). In contrast to the assumption in Barros’ and Neven’s models these authors as-
sume that firms are aware of the status of their agreements and analyze the impact of 
different policies on the firm’s decision to sign an agreement. For that purpose, they 
compare the ex ante and ex post control regime by considering a model of imperfect au-
dit. Their primary result is that the notification regime is only superior when the risk of 
errors in the evaluation is quite high. With an increasing accuracy ex post control be-
comes preferable. 
Over all, previous research on European competition policy and the current reforms in 
particular has unveiled the following: A notification regime should be favored if the risk 
of errors in the evaluation of agreements is high (Bergès-Sennou et al., 2006). Since Pir-
rung (2004) showed that the new system induces a higher probability of legal errors due 
to the decentralization one might conclude that a notification procedure should be fa-
vored. However, the system switch induces firms to follow a more conservative practice 
implementing  less  anti-competitive  agreements  (Barros,  2003).  Although  this  effect 
seems to be dominant, Barros also points out that firms will implement more restrictive 
practices as they do not have to notify anymore. In order to deter firms from such an il-
legal behavior Neven (2002) suggests increasing both the fine and the probability of de-
tection.   
A very important side effect of the reform has been neglected, yet. The question how the 
legal exemption rule affects intended legal and especially welfare enhancing innovative 
agreements when information asymmetries remain high and legality is ex ante unob-
servable, still remained unanswered. 
By applying a decision theory model, we analyze whether the current setting is effective 
in general, e.g. will deter from illegal behavior. In a second part we will discuss the ef-
fect  on  innovative  cooperations  which  are ex ante  hardly  to  distinguish from illegal 
agreements from the perspective of the competition authority. 
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4  The Model 
4.1  Basic Concept 
The overall aim of the modernization of European competition law was to make anti-
trust enforcement simpler and more efficient. Therefore, the Commission abolished the 
notification and authorization system in order to be able to focus on the most serious in-
fringements of competition law. We first analyze the effectiveness of competition law 
enforcement after the modernization by modeling the decision process of a firm that has 
to decide in favor or against an unlawful agreement. Secondly, we investigate whether 
there might be unintended side effects of the regulation probably influencing Europe’s 
Lisbon Strategy. Therefore, we analyze how innovative agreements are affected by the 
law’s incentive mechanisms. 
For our analysis of the effectiveness of the new European competition law, we assume 
the following: 
In a first step, a firm has to decide whether to go an ex ante illegal or legal path for co-
operation with a competitor or not. The first option implies a cooperation which is ex 
ante known to be illegal ( c C ). The second possibility is expected to be an innovative 
agreement (ex ante) ( I C ), which can, however, turn out to be (considered as) illegal at 
the end. After deciding whether to follow the (ex ante) illegal or legal path, the company 
has to decide whether to cooperate or not. If an agreement will be concluded, a positive 
extra profit (π > 0) can be gained.5  
In a second step, the Antitrust Authority (AA) enters the game. As the notification pro-
cedure has been abolished with the introduction of Regulation No. 1/2003, the AA is ex 
ante not aware of any agreements anymore. Hence, the AA is also not able to observe 
ex ante the legality of firms’ agreements. Now, by what means could the AA identify il-
legal cooperations? One might assume positive extra profits as a primary proxy as those 
can rather be achieved by cooperations with limited competition (i.e. cartel agreements 
or innovative agreements). However, also identifying extra profits is ex ante impossible. 
Nevertheless, high (extra) profits have a public effect; i. e. competitors file a complaint 
at the AA (or due to whistle blowing). Therefore, we assume the probability of investi-






∂ .  (0.1) 
                                                 
5  The case of unprofitable cooperations is excluded, that for further analysis, the possibility of non-
cooperation needs not to be taken into account.  
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Furthermore, p is a probability lying in the range  1 0 ≤ ≤ p . If the agreement will not be 
detected and investigated by the AA (1-p), the firm earns a positive profit (π). If the 
agreement is detected, it will come to litigation and the firm has to bear the costs (c) for 
defending itself irrespective of the outcome of the proceeding.  
If the firm will be found guilty, it has to pay a fine ( ) (• f ). The probability of being pu-
nished depends on AA’s aptitude to make an error of judgment. It is given by q with 
1 0 ≤ ≤ q  where q is assumed to be independent.6 Even in the case of detection, an illeg-
al agreement might be exculpated. This assumption of possible legal errors is also men-
tioned in Pirrung (2004) who expects a higher probability of legal errors due to the de-
centralization introduced with Regulation No. 1/2003. If the firm is found guilty, the 
agreement would be declared illegal and void according to Article 81(2) and the firm 
would have to pay a fine ( ) (π f ). In our model, the fine a convicted firm has to pay in-







In practice, a fine imposed on companies that infringe EC Treaty rules depends on the 
total turnover of the enterprise.8 A basic amount (up to 30% of the sales related to the 
infringement) will be adjusted depending on the duration and longevity of the cartel. 
The final amount of the fine shall not exceed 10% of the total turnover. However, since 
the profit is a critical factor for the assessment of the gravity of the infringement, it 
seems reasonable to model the fine as a function of the profit. This reasoning goes in 
line with van den Bergh (2006, p. 313), who argues that, ’from a deterrence perspective, 
the turnover is not a sound basis for calculating the fine.’ In order to determine the effi-
cient fine, van den Bergh proposes to use the gain brought about by the infringement in-
stead of the turnover. Furthermore, as the deterrence would be reduced if enterprises on-
ly had to pay a fine lower than their profit, the Commission can impose fines which ex-
                                                 
6  It has to be noticed that consequently, q gets assigned to different evolvements in the decision tree, in 
a way that a wrong decision given an innovative agreement implies punishing and a wrong decision if 
a cartel has arisen means not identifying the cartel at all. 
7  Guidelines on the method of setting fines to be imposed on companies that infringe EC Treaty rules, 
see press release IP/07/857 from 28 June 2006: Competition: Commission revises Guidelines for set-
ting fines in antitrust cases, available on:  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/857&format=HTML&aged=0&lang
uage=EN&guiLanguage=en (accessed on 09/04/2008) 
8  See guidelines on the method of setting fines to be imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regula-
tion No 1/2003, OJ 2006 C 210/2 from 1 September 2006.   
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ceed such profits.9 Additionally, the concerned firm might be faced with compensation 




Figure 1 shows the decision tree a company faces.  
If the firm decides to start an illegal cooperation and hence earns positive profits, it is 
confronted with the possibility of being detected  ) ( cc p π . If there is no detection, the 
company can earn an extra profit  cc π . After detection, AA enters the game and decides 
about the illegality of the cooperation. As the upper path determines per definition an il-
legal cooperation, the probability of being punished is given by (1-q), which yields to a 
payoff at the final stage of  ) ( cc cc f c π π − − . This payoff depends on the final profit mi-
nus the defending costs and the fine. If AA misjudges the cooperation and declares it as 
legal (although it is illegal), this leads to a payoff to the tune of c cc − π  with probability q. 
Otherwise, if the firm decides to start an (ex ante or intended) innovation (lower path), 
an  additional  knot  (ex post  cartel  or  ex post  innovation)  enters  the  decision  tree,  at 
which the former legal agreement turns out to be indeed legal or, contradicting the for-
                                                 
9  See Case T-9/99, HFB Fernwärmetechnik vs. Commission, [2002], II-1487 paras. 451-456. 
10  Compensation claims are a new institution in European Competition Law and can be filed in addition 
to a public litigation. In our model, potential compensation claims are considered to be part of the 
fine.   
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mer expectations, it turns out to be illegal.11 The probability that the company had a 
wrong upfront appraisal is determined by s, whereas the probability that the company 
was not mistaken is given by (1-s). Again, also s lies in the range of  1 0 ≤ ≤ s . If the 
cooperating companies err about the legal nature of their intended innovative coopera-
tion and it turns out to be a cartel, the decision path evolves identically as mentioned for 
the illegal cooperation. The only difference in development is caused by the ascertained 
values for profits and probabilities. Herein, the possible final outcomes are given by 
) ( Ic Ic f c π π − − , if AA detects and punishes the cooperation, which gets ascribed the pro-
bability (1-q).  c Ic − π  results, if AA detects but does not punish the agreement although it 
is illegal (misjudgment) and the profit, if there is no detection at all is given by  Ic π . 
If the innovative cooperation turns out to be indeed an innovation, which provides extra 
profits, the probability of being detected is given by  ) ( II p π . Under the circumstances of 
no detection the firm can earn profits of  II π . If detection occurs, AA can again decide 
whether to punish the company or not. If AA decides in favor of a punishment although 
the cooperation is legal, i.e. AA misjudges with probability q, the overall profit for the 
company yields  ) ( II II f c π π − − . Under no punishment the profit is given by  c II − π . 
The firm decides whether to join an unlawful agreement or not by calculating the ex-
pectation values (E) for all possible paths. The expectation value of the upper path gets 
ascribed E(C), whereas the expected value for the lower path is given by E(I). A single 
path is only taken into consideration if its expected value is of positive sign. Comparing 
both alternatives a company decides in favor of the higher expectation value. Hence, a 
cartel cooperation is preferred if E(C)>E(I), while E(I)>E(C) leads to a preferableness of 
the innovative agreement.  
The expectation value for an illegal cooperation is given by: 
cc cc cc cc cc cc p p c q q f c C E π π π π ) 1 ( )] ( ) 1 ))( ( [( ) ( − + − + − − − = .  (1) 
This simplifies to: 
)] 1 )( ( [ ) ( q f c p C E cc cc cc − + − = π π .  (2) 
The expectation value for the lower path consists of two separate expectation values 
(sub-expectation values), E(IC) and E(II), which can be calculated in the fourth knot. 
E(IC) is the expectation value at knot four if the company had a wrong appraisal ex 
ante, such that the innovative cooperation turned out to be illegal. E(II) signals conse-
quently the expectation value if the ex ante information was correct and the cooperation 
is indeed innovative. The sub-expectation values are given by: 
                                                 
11   In case of illegality a cartel arises.  
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Ic Ic Ic Ic Ic Ic p p c q q f c IC E π π π π ) 1 ( )] ( ) 1 ))( ( [( ) ( − + − + − − − = ,  (3) 
which is equivalent to: 
)] 1 )( ( [ ) ( q f c p IC E Ic Ic Ic − + − = π π   (4) 
and 
II II II II II II p p c q q f c II E π π π π ) 1 ( )] )( 1 ( )) ( [( ) ( − + − − + − − = ,  (5) 
which can be simplified to: 
] ) ( [ ) ( q f c p II E II II II π π + − = .  (6) 
It can easily be verified that E(IC) equals E(C), if  Ic cc π π = .  
Combining the two previously mentioned sub-expectation values and weighting them 
with s yields therefore: 
)]] 1 )( ( [ [ ]] ) ( [ )[ 1 ( ) ( q f c p s q f c p s I E Ic Ic Ic II II II − + − + + − − = π π π π .  (7) 
Reshuffling terms leads to: 
s q f p s q f p p s s p c s I E Ic Ic II II II Ic II Ic II ) 1 )( ( ) 1 ( ) ( ] ) 1 ( [ ) ( ) ( − − − − − + − − + = π π π π π (8) 
The first two terms state the expected profit for the lower path. If the profit in case of an 
ex post cartel exceeds the reachable profit from the innovative agreement, i.e. II Ic π π > , 
the maximum expected value for the path increases by the difference in profits weighted 
by s. Otherwise, the maximum profit decreases. If instead  II Ic π π =  the maximum possi-
ble expectation value is given by  II π . 
The second term determines the defending costs, which increase with the probability of 
being detected. As  II Ic p s s p ) 1 ( − =  never holds, these will always exhibit a positive 
value.12 
The last two terms signal the punishment fees, one for each possible profit. They are 
weighted with the probabilities that AA (q) or the company itself (s) make a mistake 
concerning their judgment.  
Concerning legal and illegal cooperations in the context of the Council Regulation No. 
1/2003, two different problems can occur. Firstly, under the existence of both possibili-
ties for cooperation, it might occur that the legal cooperation is overruled by the illegal 
                                                 
12  For the proof in detail see Appendix 1.  
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cooperation. Secondly, given the existence of positive probabilities for a company or the 
Antitrust Authority to make mistakes, innovative agreements can be prevented. 
For further analysis, we distinguish between the above mentioned problems, therefore.  
4.2  Positive Discrimination of Illegal Cooperations 
This section shows that, under the existence of two options for cooperation (cartel and 
innovation), it might occur that the legal cooperation is overruled by the illegal cooper-
ation. First, we assume that all profits are equal, such that II Ic cc π π π = = . Consequently, 
the probabilities of being detected and the level of fines are equal.13   
If all profits are equal, the previously mentioned expectation values simplify to: 
s q pf s pfq p s ps c I E II ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ ) ( − − − − − + − =π   (9) 
and 
)] 1 ( [ ) ( q f c p C E cc − + − =π .   (10) 
In order to determine which path is favored, one might compare the break-even points at 
which the expectation values for each path reach zero. As long as the expected profits 
are equal, our analysis is reduced to a comparison of the different terms which describe 
cost and fine (c and f(*)). Consequently, we compare: 
) 2 ( q sq s fp cp + − + with  (11) 
) 1 ( q pf cp − +  
Formula (11) can be reformulated to: 
) 1 ( ) 2 1 ( q q s q − ⇔ + − .  (12) 
The terms can only become equal if  1 = s , which means that the probability that the 
company misjudged the cooperation’s legality ex ante is 100%. Given that  1 = s , E(C) 
equals E(I) and, hence, no path is preferred.   
With  1 < s  and  5 . 0 ≥ q , the expectation value for the innovative agreement is lower than 
the value for the illegal agreement.  5 . 0 ≥ q implies that there is a high probability for 
AA to take the wrong decision. As q is independent, this means that on average 50% of 
the audited agreements were collated to the wrong category.  
                                                 
13  Let therefore f denote ) ( ) ( ) ( II Ic cc f f f f π π π = = =  and the probability of being detected p de-
notes  II Ic cc p p p = = .  
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On the other side,  1 < s  and  5 . 0 < q  yields higher expectation values for the innovation 
path. Concluding, herein exists an incentive to favor an illegal cartel agreement instead 
of the innovation.  
The more realistic case might be the second one. However, given asymmetric informa-
tion particular cases of auditing could belong to the first case. A similar result can be 
stated  for  a  situation  when  the  cartel  profits  exceed  those  from  innovation 
II Ic cc π π π > > , with  II Ic cc p p p > >  and  ). ( ) ( ) ( II Ic cc f f f π π π > >  In such a case, it 
can also be shown that under certain parameter constellations, illegal agreements over-
rule legal innovative agreements.14 
Given a benevolent but imperfectly informed Antitrust Authority raises the question of 
how optimal law enforcement should look like. As q is regarded to be exogenous, the 
AA can influence the expectation value and hence the cooperation decision only via its 
signals on the level of the fine (f) and the probability of an investigation (p). These sig-
nals can be considered optimal if they allow lawful cooperations but prevent unlawful 
agreements.  Accordingly,  wrong  signals  might  foster  illegal  agreements.  In  order  to 
keep the expected value of a planned illegal cooperation E(C) negative, the competition 
authority has to increase the probability of an investigation as well as the legislator has 
to ensure that the fine reaches an appropriate deterring level. This result supports the 
findings of Neven (2002), who stated that the introduction of the legal exemption sys-
tem leads to an increasing number of unlawful competitive practices. Thus, he claimed 
to increase both the probability of detection as well as the penalty in order to increase 
the deterrence effect.  
In line with Neven’s findings, the legislator indeed adjusted the parameters. In order to 
increase the probability of detection a new leniency policy was enacted in 2002, the re-
sources for cartel detection have been extended by establishing a new cartel-busting di-
rectorate within DG Competition in 2005 and, finally, several sector inquiries have been 
initiated in 2006. The second parameter, the fine, has been also adjusted as in September 
2006 the guidelines for setting fines were revised, allowing for higher penalties.15  
4.3  Discrimination of Innovation due to Regulation Errors 
In the following section we show that the existence of positive probabilities for a com-
pany or Antitrust Authority to make mistakes may lead to the exclusion of innovative 
agreements. The exclusion of innovative agreements is reached as soon as the expecta-
                                                 
14  For lucidity the proof and adherent statements are omitted here, for further details see Appendix 2.  
15   Furthermore, private enforcement was improved. But the impact of damage claims on antitrust en-
forcement is not yet studied as only a few cases of private litigation are known. And in these cases, a 
damage claim follows the public proceeding. Up to now, no damage claim was used to detect cartel 
activity.  
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tion value for the lower path becomes negative.16 The analysis is provided in two steps. 
In a first step we show that the expectation value of an ex ante innovation, which turned 
out to be a cartel (E(IC)), later can reach negative values if the fine and the costs for de-
fending are set very high. The second step shows that given the latter results, there exists 
also a possibility for the expectation value of the innovation path (E (I)) to become neg-
ative.  
Coming back to equation (6) 
] ) ( [ ) ( q f c p II E II II II π π + − =  
the expectation value for E(II) becomes negative if: 






+ < .  (13) 
Hence, the parameters which determine costs exceed the reachable profit divided by 
II p . As soon as  ) ( II f π  is a linear function of  II π  or given by a fraction of  II π  with 
) ( II II f π π > , the main driver for the expectation value to become negative is given by 
the defending costs (c).  
Going a step further and analyzing the overall expectation values for the lower path 
which is given by 
) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( II E s IC sE I E − + =   (14) 
allows further conclusions of possible side effects of the existence of legal exemptions. 
For s￿0, the overall expectation value becomes negative. As soon as  0 > s , the sign of 
the expectation value depends on the difference in profits provided by the ex post illegal 
or ex post legal agreement. Again, in this case, the avoidance of innovative agreements 
due to the existence of errors, defending costs, and fines cannot be expelled. 
For demonstration, we provide a simple example for the lower path to reach negative 
values. Assume that the possible profit from the upper path exceeds both possible prof-
its from the lower path, such that II Ic cc π π π = > . This is rather realistic as the company 
believes ex ante that the cooperation is innovative, which can be caused by the fact that 
the company cannot distinguish between the two possible outcomes as soon as these are 
                                                 
16   Innovative agreements might fall under the block exemption regulation on research and development 
agreements, which would reduce firms’ uncertainty about the legality of the agreement. However, we 
assume a remaining uncertainty as firstly, it is not always clear whether the agreement results in an 
innovation. Secondly, in order to apply the block exemption, firm’s collective market share shall not 
exceed 25 percent. Finally, the Commission has the possibility to withdraw the benefit of the regula-
tion.   
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equal. Hence, solving equation (14) for  II Ic π π π = = , and aiming the expectation value 
to be positive,17 this yields: 
)] 1 ( ) 1 ( [ s fq q sf c p − + − + > π .  (15) 
Reshuffling terms and assuming for simplicity that  q s = , we end up with: 
qqf qf c
p
2 2 − + >
π
.  (16) 
As  qqf qf 2 2 > , it is obvious that the possible profit has to exceed the defending costs 
plus a mark-up given by  ) 2 2 ( qqf qf − .  
However, if the expectation value is negative, rational firms avoid not only illegal, but 
also highly innovative agreements, supporting the hypothesis that the introduction of the 
legal exemption system leads to a decrease in the number of welfare enhancing and in-
novative agreements.  
4.4  Effect of a Change of Adjustment Parameters 
The analysis above showed that the probability of detection p, the defending costs c and 
the fine f have a crucial impact on the level of the expectation value. The literature on 
optimal law enforcement suggests to maximize the level of fine and to keep the proba-
bility of detection and therefore the costs of enforcement low in order to deter from anti-
competitive behavior. If the fine is not maximal, society could save enforcement costs 
by raising the fine and lowering the probability without affecting the level of deterrence 
(Becker, 1968; Polinsky and Shavell, 1979).  














.  (17) 
In the case of an illegal cartel the expectation value decreases with an increasing fine. 
The same applies in the case of an ex ante lawful agreement. If the fine will be in-














  (18) 
                                                 
17  Recall, only positive expectation values lead to a decision for a certain path in the decision tree.  
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.  (19) 
However, if the probability q of AA making the wrong decision decreases, an increase 
in the fine will have a much larger impact on the expectation value of unlawful agree-
ments: It drops to a greater extent than the expectation value of an innovative agree-
ment. Such an intended effect deters from illegal behavior while hardly affecting inno-
vative agreements. On the other hand, if AA does a bad job and q increases, this finding 
turns around and the innovative agreement befalls a higher drop in its expectation value. 
In the case of a change in the probability of detection, the costs – in contrast to a change 
of the fine – can become crucial:  








− − − =
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π   (20) 
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∂
∂









π − − =
∂
∂
.  (22) 
Assuming that the costs c are constant (and low), only the parameters q and f have an 
essential  impact  on  the expectation values. The effect would correspond to the pre-
viously mentioned result if f is changed. Again, if q decreases, this would lead to a larg-
er decrease of the expectation value for an unlawful agreement than for an innovative 
one and vice versa.  
The comparison between a change in the level of the fine and the probability of detec-
tion shows that the latter can have a huge impact on innovative agreements if the costs 
of litigation are high. If the fine is increased, the expectation values especially of unlaw-
ful agreements tend to decrease. However, if the probability of detection is increased, 
the effect depends on the costs of litigation. If these are high, both the expectation value 
for illegal and innovative agreements decrease. Hence, the legislator should keep the 
costs of a litigation low, if these can be influenced. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to 
increase the fine and reduce the probability for wrong decisions instead of increasing the 
probability of detection.   
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5  Conclusions 
In 1999, the Commission initiated a comprehensive reform of European competition 
law. The most prominent part was the enactment of Regulation No. 1/2003 in 2004. 
This paper analyzes the reform’s impact on the incentive to conclude unlawful agree-
ments as well as especially welfare enhancing innovative agreements. Therefore, we 
model a firm’s trade-off concerning illegal or legal and innovative or non-innovative 
agreements in a decision theoretic setting. We find that on the one hand, the new proce-
dural rules contribute to the law enforcement by reducing the incentive to establish il-
legal cartels. On the other hand, by the same mechanism, also innovative cooperations 
might be prevented. Thus, the legal exemption rule might prevent innovative coopera-
tions which contrasts the Lisbon Strategy and might, in the long run, endanger Europe’s 
competitiveness. 
Furthermore,  we  show  that  increasing  the  fine  leads  to  a  higher  deterrence  level  of 
unlawful agreements whereas innovative agreements are still encouraged. If, however, 
the probability of detection will be increased and the costs of litigation are high, both 
unlawful and innovative agreements are further deterred.  
These results are only partly consistent with previous research on the implications of the 
modernization. Neven (2002) among others suggested increasing both the probability of 
detection as well as the penalty in order to increase the deterrence effect.  
In contrast, we come to some different economic policy advice. If ever possible, the leg-
islator  should  keep  the  costs  of  a  litigation  low.  Additionally,  Antitrust  Authorities 
should be well-staffed and equipped to reduce the probability for wrong decisions ex 
ante. Fines might be increased. Nevertheless, the probability of detection should not be 
increased as this would lead to higher costs for society (Becker, 1968) as well as welfare 
losses due to a reduction in innovative agreements.  
Future research should analyze the effect of the new regulation on total welfare. Addi-
tionally, the effectiveness of the reform package including its recent adjustments should 
be investigated in a dynamic context.  
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Appendix 1 
The expectation value for the innovative path is given by: 
s q f p s q f p p s s p c s I E Ic Ic II II II Ic II Ic II ) 1 )( ( ) 1 ( ) ( ] ) 1 ( [ ) ( ) ( − − − − − + − − + = π π π π π , (23) 
here, the second term states the defending costs, which depend on the probability of be-
ing detected and the probability that the company received wrong information ex ante. 
This term will always reduce the maximum possible expectation value, which is deter-
mined by the first two terms, as  ] ) 1 ( [ II Ic p s s p c − + cannot become negative. 
As c is per definition a positive value, the latter term can only become negative if: 
II Ic p s s p ) 1 ( − − <   (24) 
II Ic p s s p ) 1 ( + − < .  (25) 
Since  0 ) 1 ( > − II p s ;  
this implies that 
0 ) 1 ( < − − II p s . 
Hence,  0 < s pIc . 
Because  1 0 ≤ ≤ q  and  1 0 ≤ ≤ s , the term  II p s) 1 ( −  on the right hand side cannot be-
come negative (the lowest value for the right hand side is given by zero), such that the 
total value of the right hand side can never reach a positive value. Consequently, if the 
left hand side has to approach a lower value than the right hand side, this implies that 
0 < s pIc , which is per definition precluded. 
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Appendix 2 
Again,  if  the  cartel  is  preferred,  it  must  hold  that  E(C)  >  E(I).  Assuming  that 
cc Ic II π > π > π , this yields to: 
[ ( )(1 )] (1 )[ [ ( ) ]
[ [ ( )(1 )]]
cc cc cc II II II
Ic Ic Ic
p c f q s p c f q
s p c f q
π − + π − > − π − + π
+ π − + π −
   (26)
 
Assume further that the probability of detection, as well as the fee, are linear dependent 
on excess profits (π).18 Define:  1 cc Ic   π = π  and  2 cc II   π = π , with  1 2 , 1     <  and conse-
quently  1 cc Ic p p   = ,  2 cc II p p   =  inequality (26) can be rewritten as: 
2
2 2 2 1 2 2 1
2 2 2
2 1 1
( ) ( )
( )
pc pf pfq pc pfq s spc
pfqs pfs
π− + − >   π−  −  +π   −  +   − 
+   +  −  
  (27) 
Solving for the probability q that AA makes a mistake, the following solutions have to 
be distinguished: 
2






























π− + −  π+  −π   +π   −   +   +  
<
−  +   + + 
< −  +   + 
π− + −  π+  −π   +π   −   +   +  
>
−  +   + + 
> −  +
2 2
2 1 ( ) fs   + 
 
Solution 1 states that if the probability that AA slips up (q) is smaller than the ratio on 
the  right  hand  side  and  if  the  additional  constraint,  which  is  given  by 
2 2 2
2 2 1 0 ( ) pf pf pfs < −  +   +  holds, a cartel is preferred. Furthermore, a cartel overrules 
an  innovative  agreement  if  q  exceeds  the  right  hand  side  and  if 
2 2 2
2 2 1 0 ( ) pf pf pfs > −  +   +  . 
                                                 
18  The assumption of linear dependence simplifies the proof. The results can also be assigned to expo-
nential dependence.  
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2 2 1 0 ( ) pf pf pfs < −  +   +   and solving for the probability of a firms er-
ror (s) -which highlights the probability that the firm assumes ex ante that their agree-














2   <1, the ratio on the left hand side becomes negative. Hence, solution 1 is valid for 
all probabilities s. 










  + 
, 
which can never hold as s determines a probability and has to lie in the range of  
0 1 s ≤ ≤  therefore. A positive value for the left hand side can only be reached if 
2
2   =1, 
which is excluded by assumption.19 
Concluding, solution one gives the necessary parameter constellation such that the ex-
pectation value for the cartel exceeds the innovative agreement. The same relation holds 
for exponential dependence of fees and detection probabilities on excess profits. 
                                                 
19 
2
2   =1 would lead to the proof in Appendix 1.  
__________________________________________________________________  IWH 
 
IWH-Diskussionspapiere 6/2008  25
Literature 
Barros, P. B. (2003): Looking behind the curtain – effects from modernization of Euro-
pean  Union  competition  policy,  European  Economic  Review  47  (4),  
pp. 613-624.  
Becker, G. S. (1968): Crime and Punishment: an economic approach, Journal of Politi-
cal economy, Vol. 76, pp.169-217. 
Bergès Sennou, F.; Loss, F.; Malavolti Grimal, E.; Vergé, T. (2006): European Com-
petition  Policy  Modernization:  From  Notification  to  Legal  Exception.  INSEE 
Working Paper No. 2005-38.  
Bos, I.; Schinkel, M. P. (2006): On the Scope for the European Commission’s 2006 fin-
ing guidelines under the legal maximum, in: Journal of Competition Law and 
Economics, Vol. 2 (4), pp. 673-682. 
Buccirossi, P.; Spagnolo, G. (2006): Optimal fines in the era of whistleblowers. CEPR 
Discussion Paper No. 5465. 
Garoupa,  . (1997): The theory of optimal law enforcement. Journal of Economic Sur-
veys, Vol. 11 (3), pp. 267-295. 
Geradin, D. (2002): Competition between rules and rules of competition: A legal and 
economic  analysis  of  the  proposed  modernization  of  the  enforcement  of  EC 
competition law, in: Columbia Journal of European Law, Vol. 9, pp. 1-28. 
 even, D. (2002): Removing the Notification of Agreements: Some Consequences for 
Ex Post Monitoring, in: A. v. Bogdandy, P.C. Mavroidis and Y. Mény (eds), Eu-
ropean Integration and International Coordination. Studies in Transnational Eco-
nomic Law in Honour of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann. The Hague, pp. 351-362.  
Pirrung, M. (2004): EU Enlargement towards cartel paradise? An Economic Analysis of 
the Reform of European Competition Law, in: Erasmus Law and Economics Re-
view, Vol. 1, pp. 77-109.  
Polinsky, M.; Shavell, S. (1979): The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and 
Magnitude of Fines, in: American Economic Review, Vol. 69 (5), pp. 880-891. 
Polinsky, M.; Shavell, S. (2000): The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 
in: Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 38 (1), pp. 45-76. 
Posner, R. A. (2001): Antitrust Law, 2nd edition. Chicago.   
IWH  __________________________________________________________________ 
 
IWH-Diskussionspapiere 6/2008  26
Shavell, S. (1993): The optimal structure of law enforcement, in: Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol. 36 (1), pp. 255-287. 
Stephan, A. (2006): The bankruptcy wildcard in cartel cases. CCP working paper No. 
06-5. 
Van den Bergh, R. (2006): Enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, in: 
R.Van den Bergh, P. Camesasca, (eds), European Competition Law and Eco-
nomics. A Comparative Perspective, 2
nd edition, pp. 300-347. 